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ABSTRACT
Recent controversies concerning freedom of expression on university
campuses have raised the question of how the limits of free speech can
be determined in a justified way in a pluralistic public space such as the
campus. The article addresses this question from the viewpoint of two
complementary theoretical perspectives: Rainer Forst’s respect concep-
tion of toleration, and the discourse theory of democracy developed by
J€urgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib. These theories are argued to pro-
vide a non-arbitrary, impartial and procedural model for determining
the limits of free speech on campus. Deriving primarily from the dis-
course model, the article suggests that the limits of freedom of expres-
sion on campus should be determined by collective deliberative
processes involving the affected students. Moreover, it is argued that,
instead of prohibiting controversial topics or views, the university
administration and teachers should focus on establishing procedural
rules of rational deliberation. This is argued to increase students’ under-
standing of the nature of legitimate democratic discussion and thus
accomplish the university’s educational task of fostering students’ ability
to use their freedom of speech in a responsible way.
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Although free speech controversies on campus are not a new issue, the debate has resurged as a
consequence of recent protests and events related to the matter. Especially in the United States,
controversial speakers have been met with aggressive protests. Safe spaces, free speech zones and
trigger warnings have become commonplace practices not just in the US but on campuses all over
the world (e.g. Ben-Porath, 2017; Callan, 2016; Wells, 2018). Free speech restrictions are typically
defended by arguing that sensitive issues such as race, sexuality and war are beyond reasonable
discussion or that debates on these issues might lead to offensive speech that violates the dignity
of the members of vulnerable groups (Ben-Porath, 2017). The suggested limitations have been con-
tradicted by arguments from free speech enthusiasts and absolutists who suggest that speech on
campus should be virtually unregulated once it has passed the legal threshold (Ben-Porath, 2017;
Chamlee-Wright, 2018). Also, many academics have expressed their concern that restrictions on
freedom of expression jeopardise the core functions of the university, including academic freedom
and the free and independent pursuit of knowledge (e.g. Downs, 2009).
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These concerns are evidently justified: in addition to its relevance to academic freedom and
the pursuit of knowledge, freedom of speech is one of the most important of civil rights and
central constituents of democratic life. While freedom of speech is decisive for individual auton-
omy and self-expression, it is equally vital for democratic politics as it allows subjecting citizens’
views and opinions to critical scrutiny, enables the formation of public opinion and provides the
democratically important check on the existing government (e.g. Gutmann, 1997). Because of its
crucial significance for a healthy democratic culture, proposed restrictions on freedom of speech
are justifiably met with reservation. However, as Peter Scott (2017) points out, no society has
ever granted its citizens unrestricted freedom of speech and no campus can agree that ‘anything
goes’. Especially in the current political climate, characterised by hate speech, disrespect, fake
news, and downright lying, regulations on freedom of speech seem more essential than before.
The question is thus not whether to regulate free speech on campus but, rather, how academic
speech should be regulated and by what criteria, and under whose authority.
Moreover, a perspective that is often neglected in discussions concerning free speech on cam-
pus is that universities are educational institutions and therefore not only responsible for protect-
ing the legal rights and dignity of students, but also educating them about responsible use of
freedom of speech in the public sphere. As Amy Gutmann (1997) points out, if educators convey
to students that free speech, understood as a license to say anything, will bring about justice,
they will have conveyed a dangerous untruth. She further points out that the way in which citi-
zens use their freedom of speech is certainly influenced by the way in which they have been
taught, and therefore education cannot be neutral on this issue. As an educational institution,
the university should take responsibility for educating students about the discursive norms that
ought to apply to legitimate democratic discussion and thus take part in creating conditions for
a well-functioning democracy.
In this article, my aim is to respond to the following two questions: first, how the limits of
free speech can be drawn in a non-arbitrary and impartial way on university campus and,
second, how responsible use of freedom of expression can be promoted in higher education. It
should be noted that my suggestions are primarily applicable to the context of liberal demo-
cratic societies in which freedom of speech and pluralism concerning values and worldviews are
broadly endorsed values in higher education and where the relationships between students and
teachers are relatively non-hierarchical. I approach the first question through the notion of toler-
ation, because controversies over freedom of speech are ultimately disputes over what kind of
speech can and cannot be tolerated in a pluralistic public space such as the campus.1 Hence, to
respond to the first question, I draw from Rainer Forst’s (2004, 2013) respect conception of toler-
ation, which is rooted in the principles of reciprocity and generality. The core idea of the respect
conception is that while the tolerating parties find the views held by others as ethically reject-
able, they nevertheless recognise others’ right to hold these views and thus practice toleration
reciprocally (Forst, 2004). Accordingly, I suggest that the respect conception provides normative
criteria based on which conflicts over freedom of expression on campus can be resolved in a
relatively impartial way, reflecting the interests of all students equally rather than prioritising the
views and values of one group over others.
To answer the second question, and also to elaborate on my response to the first, I employ
J€urgen Habermas’ (1996) and Seyla Benhabib’s (1992, 1996) discourse theories of democracy.
Habermas’ and Benhabib’s works align with Forst’s respect conception in the sense that the
model of rational discourse developed in these works embodies the central normative principles
of the respect conception, reciprocity and generality (see Forst, 2013; Habermas, 2004).
Moreover, Habermas’ and Benhabib’s theories complement and extend the respect conception in
a fruitful way: in these theories, the limits of toleration are associated with procedural rules of
deliberation. Accordingly, the discourse theory of democracy provides a procedure through
which the limits of toleration can be determined by those affected by these limits without
excluding particular topics, views or identities in beforehand. My argument is that this discourse
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theoretical interpretation of toleration has important implications for drawing the limits of free
speech on campus and for educating students concerning responsible use of free speech. First,
the discourse theory of democracy provides a model for drawing the limits of free speech
through student deliberation, without setting prima facie restrictions to topics of discussion or to
the identities and views of participants. Consequently, the model allows relinquishing ‘gag rules’
and trigger warnings, which are often found problematic from the viewpoint of academic free-
dom, and which prevent learning from discussions on controversial topics (Ben-Porath, 2017;
Davids, 2018). Second, the focus of the discourse model on rules of deliberation serves the edu-
cational and democratic functions of the university because by learning about the rules of legit-
imate democratic deliberation, students also learn what it means to use one’s freedom of speech
in a responsible way.
The article is structured as follows: in the next section, I introduce Forst’s respect conception
of toleration and suggest that it can provide relatively impartial criteria of toleration for the cam-
pus understood as a public space. After that, I move on to discussing J€urgen Habermas’ and
Seyla Benhabib’s discourse theories of democracy with the purpose of demonstrating how these
theories complement and extend Forst’s respect conception. Then I move on to demonstrating
how the discourse model could be employed on campus and indicate the educational and nor-
mative potential involved in the implementation of the model in the context of higher educa-
tion. The final section focuses on concluding remarks.
Defining the concept of toleration for the campus as a public space
The mass higher education systems in most liberal democratic societies have become ‘rainbow’
systems that reflect the diversity of the societies in which they are embedded (Scott, 2017). In
the context of today’s liberal democracies, the campus can be understood as a public space or a
pluralistic context involving a variety of different ethical views of the good and political views on
how society should be organised (e.g. Fleming, 2010; Giroux, 2002). Moreover, in democratic
societies, universities typically involve a strong preference for diversity, pluralism and inclusion,
and universities also attempt to provide equal opportunities for the expression of a variety of dif-
ferent voices and perspectives, including those of the marginalised and vulnerable groups (Ben-
Porath, 2017). Public universities should also prepare students for their roles as citizens of the
democratic society and thus provide them with competences and capabilities associated with
democratic citizenship, the ideas of public justification and reasoning being among the most
central (e.g. Gutmann, 1999).
Based on this understanding of the campus as a diverse and public space, free speech contro-
versies on campus should be resolved in a way that reflects this diversity. The important ques-
tion thus is, how conflicts over freedom of expression can be resolved in an impartial way,
reflecting the interests of all students equally rather than prioritising the views and values of one
group over others. Rainer Forst’s (2004, 2013) theory of toleration represents an attempt to
develop an impartial notion of toleration for the public sphere in democratic societies. At the
core of his theory is the respect conception of toleration, which is based on the principles of reci-
procity and generality. In this context, reciprocity means that no one is justified to make claims
concerning certain rights or resources that one denies to others, and that one should not project
one’s own values or interests onto others. Generality refers to the idea that reasons for basic
norms need to be reciprocally acceptable among all citizens, not just the dominant parties
(Forst, 2004, p. 317). What follows from the respect conception of toleration is the demand to
“tolerate those beliefs and practices with which one disagrees but which themselves do not vio-
late the criteria or the ‘threshold’ of reciprocity and generality” (Forst, 2004, p. 317). According to
the respect conception, the tolerating parties thus recognise that while they may hold different,
even incompatible ethical views, they respect each other as moral-political equals in the sense
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that they see that their common framework of social life should be guided by norms that all par-
ties can equally accept.
As Forst (2004) further points out, the limits of toleration are reached when one party tries to
dominate others by making its rejectable views the general norm. This represents a form of
intolerance that cannot be tolerated. There are thus two limits associated with the notion of tol-
eration: the first limit is reached with views that are not agreed with but nevertheless tolerated
because of the respect for the equal rights of those presenting these views. The other, absolute
and final limit of toleration is reached with views that simply cannot be tolerated because they
violate the criteria of reciprocity and generality inherent in the respect conception (Forst, 2001,
2004). Importantly, Forst (2004, 2013) argues that the intolerance toward the views that cross
the second threshold is not simply another form of ethical intolerance because it does not abso-
lutise one controversial ethical view. Namely, the respect conception ultimately derives its justifi-
cation from the idea of justification itself; it rests on normative reasons that cannot be
reciprocally and generally rejected (Forst, 2013, p. 453, italics in original). In other words, the
respect conception cannot be rejected without rejecting the idea of reciprocal and general justi-
fication itself. Consequently, someone who rejects the respect conception cannot consistently
demand toleration or equal treatment from others because that would require appealing to the
principles that one rejects.
I suggest that the respect conception of toleration described above can provide a plausible
foundation for resolving controversies over freedom of speech in a pluralistic setting such as the
university campus. As Forst (2004) points out, the respect conception departs from what he calls
a “permission conception” (p. 315), in which either some authority or the majority gives qualified
permission to the members of the minority to live according to their beliefs on the condition
that the minority accepts the dominant position of the authority and does not demand to be
recognised as equal. This form of toleration would not be justified in a pluralist and public set-
ting such as the campus because it illegitimately prioritises one comprehensive view or a set of
values over those of others and thus fails to reflect the diversity of the views represented by stu-
dents. In what follows, I elaborate on Forst’s respect conception of toleration through the works
of Habermas and Benhabib.
Discourse theory of democracy and the rules of deliberation as limits of toleration
J€urgen Habermas’ discourse theory of democracy is a continuation of his broad philosophical
project and rooted in the central ideas of his previous theories, the theory of communicative
action and discourse ethics. At the core of Habermas’ (1994, 1996) democratic theory and dis-
course ethics is a similar idea as the one expressed by Forst’s respect conception: in pluralistic
societies where there is no common religion or ethos to found normative decisions on, contro-
versies over shared norms should be resolved from an impartial viewpoint and in the equal inter-
est of all affected persons. Because no party alone can accomplish such a viewpoint of
impartiality, controversies over shared norms of action must be resolved through a collective
process of deliberation, which includes all affected parties and their different perspectives and
ethical and political views (Habermas, 1994, 1996).
Importantly, for the process to yield impartial and genuinely legitimate outcomes, several nor-
mative preconditions must apply to deliberation: the process must be inclusive of all affected
parties, all participants must be treated equally, participants must be sincere and truthful in their
arguments, and the process of deliberation must be free from internal and external coercion and
constraints other than the force of the better argument (Habermas, 1994). Habermas (1994,
1996) refers by the term of rational discourse to an ideal speech situation in which these precon-
ditions are fulfilled. These preconditions are expressed in a condensed form by the discourse
principle (D), which states that “only those norms of action are valid to which all possibly
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affected persons could assent as participants in rational discourses” (Habermas, 1996, p. 459).
Habermas’ democratic theory, in turn, is an attempt to demonstrate how (D) can be institutional-
ised in the medium of politics and law through a system or rights, which defines how citizens
must perceive their mutual political relations as participants in the processes of legitimate
law-making.2
Seyla Benhabib (1992) elaborates on Habermas’ discourse ethics by outlining two central prin-
ciples, which should apply to democratic deliberation for it to yield legitimate outcomes: (1) uni-
versal moral respect, which requires that all beings capable of speech and action must be
included as participants in the moral conversation; and (2) egalitarian reciprocity, which demands
that all participants must have the same symmetrical rights to various speech acts, initiate new
topics, and ask for reflection about the presuppositions of conversation (Benhabib, 1992, p. 29,
italics in original). According to Benhabib (1992, 1996), these two principles constitute the
rational preconditions of deliberation and thus function as ‘rules’ of deliberation that guide the
actions of participants. The essential content of these rules is similar to Habermas’s preconditions
of rational discourse, as they require that everyone affected by the disputed norms must be
included in deliberation and that everyone must be granted equal rights in their role as partici-
pants in deliberation.
These rules of deliberation, outlined by Habermas and Benhabib, share the normative core
content of Forst’s respect conception as they demand that the interests of all affected parties
must be taken into consideration (generality) and that the participants of deliberation must be
treated equally (reciprocity).3 Importantly, these rules set the limits of toleration in the discourse
model (Thomassen, 2006). As Habermas (1998) points out, doctrines that “claim exclusiveness for
a privileged way of life” (p. 224) and lack understanding of the fallibility of their claims, are
incompatible with constitutional democracy and the associated idea of equal rights and thus fall
beyond the purview of toleration. However, the reason not to tolerate such doctrines is not asso-
ciated with the topics of discussion introduced or the identities of those presenting the intoler-
able views. Rather, the reason for intolerance is the nature of the arguments that violate the
procedural rules of legitimate democratic discussion. As Benhabib (1996) points out, in discourse
theory of democracy, there are no prima facie rules delimiting the agenda of conversation or the
identities of participants. Accordingly, no particular issues or topics should be considered as
being “off the agenda” (Benhabib, 1996, p. 79) of public discussion or ruled out in beforehand,
not even controversial topics such as sexuality, race, war, and other themes that are often sub-
ject to trigger warnings on campus. The core idea of rational deliberation is that while the pro-
cess should be maximally inclusive, the normative preconditions of deliberation should ensure
that illegitimate claims do not ‘pass’ the test of argumentation.
Importantly, both Habermas (1994, 1996) and Benhabib (1992, 1996) see the rules of argu-
mentation as arising from the reciprocal expectations of the participants in deliberation and thus
receiving their normative force from mechanisms endogenous to argumentation instead of some
external authority. Therefore, they both suggest that even the rules of deliberation should be in
principle open to discussion.4 However, as Benhabib (1996) emphasises, the reciprocal nature of
deliberation ensures that these rules cannot be overruled or abrogated without first fully engag-
ing with them and taking these rules “absolutely seriously” (p. 80). She argues that nobody can
convince others in public discussion without being able to explain why what appears to oneself
as good, plausible or convincing should be understood in the same way by others (Benhabib,
1996). Therefore, by taking part in deliberation, one is required to consider the viewpoint of all
those affected and thus to accept, at least to some degree, the rules of the process, even if it is
only to contest them. This ideally prevents inegalitarian or intolerant views from being tolerated,
unless the arguments supporting these views can convince others of their plausibility, including
those toward whom the intolerance is directed.
The discourse theory of democracy described above has often been contested for being
unrealistic concerning the nature of political action and, consequently, incapable of addressing
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actual inequalities (e.g. Ellsworth, 1997; Sanders, 1997; Young, 1996). However, in my view, these
critiques fail to acknowledge the intentionally ideal or aspirational nature of the theory: the dis-
course theory of democracy aims to offer a normative model of democratic legitimacy rather
than a description of actual processes of deliberation. As Benhabib (1996) points out, the proced-
ural rules of deliberation act as test cases for critically examining the rules of membership,
agenda setting and structuring of deliberation in different public institutions and thus provide a
normative foundation for justified critique of these institutions. In a similar way as the respect
conception of toleration, the discourse model derives its justification from the idea of reciprocal
and general justification itself. That is, the rules of deliberation arise from participants’ counter-
factual expectations, which they cannot consistently reject in so far as they wish to take part in
the practice of justifying shared norms of action in the first place (Habermas, 1990).5 In the next
section, my intention is to demonstrate the educational and normative potential associated with
this model of democratic legitimacy, particularly focusing on the relevance of the model con-
cerning the issue of free speech on campus, and the educational and democratic functions of
higher education.
Resolving free speech issues on campus through rational deliberation
The literature on education for deliberative democracy and citizenship is rather extensive, with
some works drawing from Habermas’ and Benhabib’s theories (e.g. Englund, 2010, 2011;
Fleming, 2010; Martin, 2012). However, very few of these works address issues related to freedom
of speech or directly discuss the relevance of the discourse model for determining the limits of
free speech.6 Accordingly, the suggestions introduced in this section can be considered as a
novel contribution to the discussion on the relevance of the discourse model to education.
Nevertheless, my suggestions are indebted to the idea expressed in many of the previous works
on deliberative citizenship education, according to which a well-functioning democracy depends
on the existence of an educated citizenry and especially citizens’ communicative competences
and reasonableness (e.g. Callan, 1997; Gutmann, 1999). Moreover, I also share the view expressed
in some of the previous works that students learn to deliberate best by taking part in deliber-
ation (Englund, 2010; Fleming, 2010; Gutmann, 1999). Accordingly, in addition to outlining a
model of rational deliberation, which enables determining the limits of free speech on campus
in an impartial manner, my purpose is to indicate how students can be educated concerning the
nature of legitimate democratic deliberation in a way that might serve the democratic society.
As applied to the context of free speech controversies on campus, the normative content of
the discourse model can be summarised through the following two points: first, the process of
determining the limits of free speech should involve all those affected by these limits and,
second, the regulations set by the university staff and administration should concern the proced-
ural rules of deliberation rather than particular topics, views or the identities of participants. Let
us start with the first point: as Habermas (1996) and Benhabib (1992) suggest, determining the
limits of toleration requires involving those affected by these limits in the process of deliberation.
Accordingly, implementing the discourse model on university campuses should ideally involve
organising deliberations – for instance, public discussions, debates and panel discussions, the
preferable form of conversation depending on the situation – among students and academics
who are affected by these limits. Evidently, campuses are large units, and therefore it may not
be possible to physically include all students in the process. However, while the actual deliber-
ation might take place among student representatives and staff members, the events should be
made open to larger audiences.
From the perspective of the discourse model, the evident benefit of involving students in the
decision-making process is associated with the legitimacy of decisions. As noted above, the dis-
course theoretical notion of legitimacy rests upon the idea that those being affected by the
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norms should also be the authors of these norms, this ensuring that the norms are voluntarily
agreed upon (Habermas, 1996). Moreover, allowing student participation might help prevent
future controversies and conflicts because being given the possibility to take part in the deci-
sion-making process, students might have less reason to protest when other students and aca-
demics use their right to free expression within the commonly agreed upon limits. Moreover,
top-down regulations and bans may leave students feeling that their rights to free expression
have been illegitimately delimited without sufficient justification and without hearing what the
students themselves have to say on the issue. It is also noteworthy that the university adminis-
tration does not always make wise or impartial decisions as even the most well-intending aca-
demics are influenced by many interests and may fail to make decisions with the equal interest
of all students in view. This is why it is crucially important to leave the discursive space open to
contestation and ensure that no single party or person has concentrated power on decisions
concerning free speech regulations.
However, involving students in the decision-making processes does not mean that the delib-
erations should be unconstrained of without supervision and curation by the university adminis-
tration. From the perspective of the discourse model, the crucial insight is that instead of top-
down regulations and bans, the role of the university administration and staff should be to
ensure that certain conversational constraints or discursive rules are sufficiently realised in the
process of deliberation. Inclusivity being among the most important preconditions of rational
deliberation, the university should warrant that invitations to take part in deliberation are
extended to all students or student representatives affected by the suggested regulations and
that all relevant parties are guaranteed equal opportunities to express their viewpoints in the
course of deliberation. It is particularly important that marginalised and vulnerable groups are
warranted equal access to deliberation and that their voices are not silenced or their viewpoints
overlooked, bearing in mind that exclusion can also be internal to the process of deliberation.
For instance, hate speech and ridicule can cause students or groups of students to withdraw
from discussion (e.g. Ben-Porath, 2017).
This takes us to the second point: in addition to guaranteeing that the process of deliberation
meets the aforementioned formal requirements, such as inclusivity and equal opportunities to
various speech acts, there should also be regulations ensuring that the arguments and speech
acts presented in deliberation meet the normative preconditions of legitimate deliberation. While
actual political deliberations cannot be dictated or the quality of the arguments and reasoning
employed in them cannot be externally influenced – which makes political processes not only
profoundly undetermined but also subject to misuse – universities are educational institutions
and have the responsibility to educate students concerning the discursive norms and rules that
should apply to legitimate democratic deliberation. As Gutmann (1997) points out, students
should know and be shown that they are expected to use their free speech responsibly at the
same time as they know that they are being educated to become democratic citizens with the
fullest range of rights and responsibilities, including the rights and responsibilities of free speech.
As she further suggests, the difference between politics and education is that in educational con-
texts educators structure the environment of students so that they can teach and be taught by
others, whereas citizens participate as equals in structuring the very environment in which they
enjoy freedom of speech and other basic rights.
Accordingly, my suggestion is that the discourse theory of democracy can function as a
model for creating an educational environment where students can be taught about the discur-
sive norms that should apply to legitimate democratic discussion. This educational dimension is
often missing from the accounts that address free speech regulations solely from the perspective
of legislation and rights and their appropriate implementation on campus. In the context of
higher education, the rules of democratic deliberation such as the ones introduced by the dis-
course model – including universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity (Benhabib, 1992) –
should be explicitly addressed and their relevance to securing impartial and legitimate outcomes
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should be demonstrated to students. These rules should at least indicate, first, that no one
affected by the outcomes of deliberation should be excluded from the process, either by con-
cretely preventing their participation or silencing them through speech; and, second, that neither
the form nor the content of students’ arguments should violate the presupposition of equality of
all participants. Finally, students should also be asked to consider their arguments and claims
from the impartial perspective of all students, not just their own immediate interests. It is import-
ant that students understand the role that these rules play in securing the impartiality and legit-
imacy of the process of deliberation; otherwise these rules will appear to students as nothing
more than another set of externally imposed restrictions.
Importantly, by focusing on the rules of legitimate deliberation as the limits of toleration, the
discourse model abolishes the need to restrict the topics of discussion and thus it might help
eradicate ‘gag rules’ and trigger warnings, which are often found problematic from the perspec-
tive of academic freedom. Moreover, as Ben-Porath (2017) points out, discussion on controversial
topics in a planned and mindful manner supports the development of informed, critical, and
engaged citizens, and thus forms an integral part of the ethics of pedagogy in a higher educa-
tion context. Nuraan Davids (2018) makes a similar point as she argues that top-down bans and
prohibitions by the university administration often end up missing the educative potential
involved in controversial expressions, because such regulations prevent the engagement of stu-
dents. In addition, Benhabib argues that restricting topics of discussion in public dialogue is
ultimately a greater threat to democracy than permitting the existence of “divergent, incompat-
ible and even hostile conceptions of the good” (Benhabib, 1992, p. 116). This might be particu-
larly true regarding the university, because it is an arena in which fluid and experimental ideas
and social markers are introduced and in which many social justice movements have seen day-
light. Accordingly, ruling out certain topics of discussion prior to deliberation might prevent
important social issues from being raised and discussed publicly. In this sense, trigger warnings
and gag rules might even serve as means of marginalisation and structural injustice.
However, as important as it is to allow deliberation on various controversial topics, including
race, sexuality, economy and war, is to prevent the misuse of processes of deliberation for parti-
san or even discriminative purposes. Hence, whereas in political discourses deliberation itself
must be trusted to filter out illegitimate outcomes, in the context of higher education, represen-
tatives of the staff and university administration should act as moderators who, while giving as
much authority to the students as possible, intervene with the process whenever the rules of
deliberation are questioned or violated. However, as Eamonn Callan (2011) points out, interven-
tion does not have to mean silencing. Rather, from a discourse theoretical perspective, a proper
way to intervene with claims that challenge the rules of deliberation is to ask for justification for
these claims and check whether the given justifications meet the preconditions of rational delib-
eration and, ultimately, succeed in convincing other participants of their plausibility. For instance,
a student expressing racist opinions can be asked to justify his or her opinions from the view-
point of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity, with the probable result that his or
her views are found intolerable by others. As Habermas (2004) points out, in the case of racism,
the adequate response is not toleration but the struggle against discrimination, and thus the
racist “should quite simply overcome his racism” (p. 10).
Evidently, there are situations in which intervention and moderation of discussion by the uni-
versity administration or staff might be difficult or even impossible to realise. These situations
include the cases of invited speakers who, while not necessarily being known as controversial
speakers, are not obligated to follow the rules of deliberation in their presentations and
speeches. In these cases, visiting speakers might be informed in advance about the university
policy concerning responsible use of free speech. It should also be ensured by the university
administration that any controversial views presented by invited speakers can be questioned and
discussed openly in accordance with the rules of deliberation described above. Another difficult
case involves the events organised and sponsored by students themselves: while the university
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should encourage students to practice their freedom of speech through various student-organ-
ised events, it should also ensure that these events do not undermine the university’s commit-
ment to responsible use of free speech. One possibility to address this issue is to form a
committee of students, representing the student body as broadly as possible, which keeps track
of and regularly takes part in student-organised events and spreads information to the organis-
ing students about responsible use of free speech in accordance with the university policy.
Moreover, the idea that students should be involved in the process of determining the limits
of free speech on campus is not entirely without problems: the university is not only legally obli-
gated by free speech legislation but also responsible for protecting the rights and dignity of stu-
dents. Accordingly, student deliberations might not be the appropriate way of resolving free
speech controversies in all situations and contexts. Especially in severe cases with actual threat
to students’ safety, well-being and integrity involved, deliberations among students might be
considered as informative rather than decisive, and the university administration or a committee
consisting of staff members might have the final call on regulations and possible sanctions. This
also applies to situations where consensus cannot be reached among the disputing parties des-
pite prolonged deliberations. However, even if the university administration has the final author-
ity, from the perspective of discursive legitimacy, the decisions should be informed as much as
possible by the arguments and viewpoints presented by students. As Gutmann (1997) points
out, students grow into taking responsibility for their speech acts, and this growing is possible
only if they are also granted sufficient freedom of expression; freedom, which is precisely prohib-
ited by top-down regulations.
Conclusions
Drawing the limits of toleration concerning freedom of speech in liberal democratic societies is a
complex and controversial issue. In this article, I have introduced the discourse theory of democ-
racy as a model for drawing the limits of free expression in an impartial way in the context of
the university campus, which is a public, pluralistic space. My suggestion was that students
themselves should be allowed to take part in determining the limits of free speech on campus,
this claim deriving from the discourse theoretical view of legitimacy and also from the insight,
common to many representatives of deliberative citizenship education, according to which stu-
dents learn to deliberate best by participating in deliberation (Englund, 2010; Fleming, 2010;
Gutmann, 1999).
My other central argument was that the regulations set by the university administration and
teachers should focus on rules or discursive norms of deliberation rather than controversial
topics, not only because there is significant educational potential associated with discussions on
controversial issues, but also because students should learn about the nature and norms of legit-
imate democratic discussion. This seems particularly important in the present ‘post-truth era’ and
the prevailing culture of democratic discussion. As Seyla Benhabib (1996) points out, the dis-
course model of democracy reflects the underlying rationale of actual democratic practices, and
although the normative presuppositions of rational deliberation may not be often realised in
today’s democratic politics, most citizens still intuitively condemn and recognise as illegitimate
such forms of communication as propaganda, lying, personal insults, hate speech, and other
forms of untruthful and intolerable speech. As long as the illegitimacy of these forms of commu-
nication is recognised and there is a desire to improve the culture of democratic discussion in
society, legitimate forms of democratic discussion should be fostered by educational institutions,
including higher education.
Finally, I would like to draw attention to the idea, central to the deliberative model, that the
limits of free speech on campus should be viewed as always being open to renegotiation and
challengeable by new insights or new parties taking part in deliberation. Free speech regulations
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should thus be seen as a transformable “project” (Habermas, 1998, p. 70). This insight is particu-
larly important for preserving the democratic and transformational potential of the university,
associated with the possibility of introducing and addressing novel and controversial social and
political issues and forming new social movements.
Notes
1. Toleration is a controversial concept in contemporary philosophy. In theories of democracy, toleration has
typically been viewed as a virtue and an expression of mutual respect. However, in poststructuralist critique,
the concept has been interpreted as being intertwined with power relations and associated with potentially
repressive attitudes and practices. Due to limited space, I cannot address this discussion here. On the definition
and justification of tolerance, see Forst (2013); on poststructuralist critique of tolerance, see Brown (2006); and
on education for tolerance as a democratic virtue, see Drerup (2019).
2. The rights included in the system of rights fall into five broad categories. The first three are the basic negative
liberties, membership rights, and due-process rights that together guarantee individual freedom and private
autonomy. The fourth, rights of political participation, guarantees public autonomy. For a more extensive
description of the system of rights and their relevance in Habermas’ theory of democracy, see Habermas (1996,
pp. 122–123).
3. Forst (2013) explicitly states the indebtedness of his theory of toleration to Habermas’ discourse ethics in his
central work on toleration. Similarly, Habermas (2004) connects his discourse theory of democracy with Forst’s
theory of toleration in his essay “Religious tolerance: The pacemaker for cultural rights”. For further discussions
on the discourse theory of democracy and the notion of toleration, see Johnson (2000) and Thomassen (2006).
4. Habermas makes the point of the underdetermined or “unsaturated” (Habermas, 1996, p. 125) nature of the
rules of deliberation particularly in his Between Facts and Norms (1996) and the essay collection The Inclusion of
the Other (1998) where he argues that, in the medium of law and politics, basic constitutional rights function
as the procedural preconditions of democratic deliberation. Accordingly, Habermas argues that the constitution
should be viewed as a “project” (Habermas, 1998, p. 70) and open to reinterpretation in different historical
contexts and by the comprehensive ethical doctrines prevailing in society.
5. Habermas’ argument is that in so far as participants engage in the practice of argumentation, they must, as a
condition of the intelligibility of the practice, assume that the preconditions of rational argumentation are
satisfied to a sufficient degree. In this sense, these presuppositions create “a weak transcendental necessity”
(Habermas, 1996, p. 4) and can only be disregarded at the cost of performative contradiction. Evidently, if the
participants in deliberation do not even want to resolve normative conflicts in a legitimate manner, do not
believe that it is possible to resolve such conflicts in a rational way, or simply aim to get their own ideas
through or win the argument, then they are not engaged in a practice of justification and have no reason to
adhere to the rules of argumentation. Responding to this type of argument, however, falls beyond the scope
of this article. For Habermas’ response to this type of sceptical argument, see Habermas (1990, pp. 43–115).
6. Amy Gutmann (1997) addresses the topic of free speech in education in one of her articles, but her article
represents a general defence of free speech in the context of primary education rather than an attempt to
apply a particular model of deliberation to resolving free speech issues, the latter being the focus of
this article.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Tuija Kasa, Iida Pyy, Eeva Rontu, Dr. Eero Salmenkivi, Katariina Tiainen, and Minna-Kerttu
Vienola for their comments on the manuscript of this article in the Philosophy of education research seminar at
the University of Helsinki.
Disclosure statement
The author declares that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this article.
Funding
This work was supported by the Academy of Finland under Grant 308934.
1180 A. LEIVISKÄ
Notes on contributor
Anniina Leivisk€a, PhD, works as a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki, Faculty of Educational
Sciences in Finland. Her major areas of research include theories of democracy and citizenship education. She is
particularly interested in the topics of inclusion and equality in the context of democratic politics and education.
Her current research project Democracy, Education and the Challenge of Inclusion: Reconstructing a Theory of




Benhabib, S. (1992). Situating the self: Gender, community and postmodernism in contemporary ethics. Polity Press.
Benhabib, S. (1996). Toward a deliberative model of democratic legitimacy. In S. Benhabib (Ed.), Democracy and dif-
ference: Contesting the boundaries of the political (pp. 67–94). Princeton University Press.
Ben-Porath, S. (2017). Free speech on campus. University of Pennsylvania Press.
Brown, W. (2006). Regulating aversion: Tolerance in the age of identity and empire. Princeton University Press.
Callan, E. (1997). Creating citizens: Political education and liberal democracy. Clarendon Press.
Callan, E. (2011). When to shut students up: Civility, silencing, and free speech. Theory and Research in Education,
9(1), 3–22. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878510394352
Callan, E. (2016). Education in safe and unsafe spaces. Philosophical Inquiry in Education, 24(1), 64–78.
Chamlee-Wright, E. (2018). Governing campus speech: A bottom-up approach. Society, 55(5), 392–402. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s12115-018-0279-1
Davids, N. (2018). On the tolerance of hate speech: Does it have legitimacy in a democracy? Ethics and Education,
13(3), 1–308. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449642.2018.1477036
Downs, D. A. (2009). Restoring free speech and liberty on campus. Cambridge University Press.
Drerup, J. (2019). Education, epistemic virtues, and the power of toleration. Critical Review of International Social
and Political Philosophy, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2019.1616883
Ellsworth, E. (1997). Teaching positions: Difference, pedagogy, and the power of address. Teacher’s College Press.
Englund, T. (2010). Educational implications of the idea of deliberative democracy. In M. Murphy & T. Fleming
(Eds.), Habermas, critical theory and education (pp. 19–32). Routledge.
Englund, T. (2011). The potential of education for creating mutual trust: Schools as sites for deliberation.
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 43(3), 236–248. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-5812.2009.00594.x
Fleming, T. (2010). Condemned to learn: Habermas, university and the learning society. In M. Murphy & T. Fleming
(Eds.), Habermas, critical theory and education (pp. 111–124). Routledge.
Forst, R. (2001). Tolerance as a virtue of justice. Philosophical Explorations, 4(3), 193–206. https://doi.org/10.1080/
10002001098538716
Forst, R. (2004). The limits of toleration. Constellations, 11(3), 312–325. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1351-0487.2004.
00379.x
Forst, R. (2013). Toleration in conflict. Cambridge University Press.
Giroux, H. (2002). Neoliberalism, corporate culture, and the promise of higher education: The university as a demo-
cratic public sphere. Harvard Educational Review, 72(4), 425–464. https://doi.org/10.17763/haer.72.4.
0515nr62324n71p1
Gutmann, A. (1997). What is the value of free speech for students? Arizona State Law Journal, 29(2), 519–536.
Gutmann, A. (1999). Democratic education. Princeton University Press.
Habermas, J. (1990). Moral consciousness and communicative action (C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholsen, Trans.). MIT
Press.
Habermas, J. (1994). Justification and application: Remarks on discourse ethics (C. Cronin, Trans.). The MIT Press.
Habermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy (W. Rehg,
Trans.). The MIT Press.
Habermas, J. (1998). The inclusion of the other: Studies in political theory (C. Cronin & P. De Greiff, Eds.). Cambridge
University Press.
Habermas, J. (2004). Religious tolerance: The pacemaker for cultural rights. Philosophy, 79(1), 5–18. https://doi.org/
10.1017/S0031819104000026
Johnson, P. (2000). Discourse ethics and the normative justification of tolerance. Critical Horizons, 1(2), 281–305.
https://doi.org/10.1163/156851600750133388
EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY 1181
Martin, C. (2012). Education in a post-metaphysical world: Rethinking educational policy and practice through J€urgen
Habermas’ discourse morality. Bloomsbury Publishing.
Sanders, L. (1997). Against deliberation. Political Theory, 25(3), 347–376. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0090591797025003002
Scott, P. (2017). “Free speech” and “offensive” speech on campus. International Higher Education, 91, 3–5. https://
doi.org/10.6017/ihe.2017.91.10122
Thomassen, L. (2006). The inclusion of the other? Habermas and the paradox of tolerance. Political Theory, 34(4),
439–462. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591706288234
Wells, C. E. (2018). Free speech hypocrisy: Campus free speech conflicts and the sub-legal first amendment.
University of Colorado Law Review, 89(2), 533–564.
Young, I. (1996). Communication and the other: Beyond deliberative democracy. In S. Benhabib (Ed.), Democracy
and difference: Contesting the boundaries of the political (pp. 120–135). Princeton University Press.
1182 A. LEIVISKÄ
